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IN THE SUPREME co~URT 
OF THE STATE O·F UTAH 
J. B. & R. E. WALKER, INC., 
a Utah Corporation and 
J. B. WALKER and GUDVOR W. 
BRABY, dba WALKER SAND & 
GRAVEL COMP ANY,a \ 
partnership, \ 
Plalintiff- Respondent, 
-vs.-
J. KENNETH THAYN dba 
THAYN CONSTRUCTION 
COMPANY, 
Defendant- Appellant. 
Case 
No.10224 
BRIEF OF APP·ELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE 
This is an action for an alleged breach of a leasehold 
agreement and a counterclaim for a similar breach. The 
Court over defendant's objection granted a hearing on 
parts of plaintiffs' first Cause of Action under Chapter 
33, Title 78, Utah Code Annotated, relating to Decla.ra-
1 
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tory Judgments. Defendants alleged that a Declaratory 
Judgment was not appropriate. 
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT 
The Case was tried to the Court sitting without a 
jury, the Court denying defendant's objections and grant-
ing judgment for plaintiffs that defendant's rights had 
been terminated, cancelled and annulled to the leasehold 
agreement (Tr. 43). 
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL, 
Defendant seeks reversal of the judgment and judg-
ment in his favor, or that failing a new trial. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
The parties entered into a leasehold agreement dated 
April 11, 1964, as represented by tvv-.o agreements at-
tached to the Complaint (Tr. 9 through 12). One of the 
instruments contained a prohibition against assignment 
without lessor's written consent (Tr. 10). Pursuant to 
this agreement defendant then entered into possession of 
the premises described in the leasehold agreement and 
oprated a hot asphalt plant until Novmber 12, 1963, when 
with the plaintiff's verbal permission (L. 16-L. 30 P. 69, 
L. 13-L. 30, P. 70) he entered into an agreement with 
James C. Sumsion (Exhibit P. 1). Sumsion immediately 
moved his equipment on premises and subsequently com-
menced operations without objection or incident from 
2 
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plaintiff until April 9, 1964, when defendant was served 
with notice alleging termination and rescission of the 
leasehold agreement (Tr. 13-17). James C. Sumsion re-
mained on premises and is presently operating the 
premises. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT 
PARTS OF PLAINTIFFS' FIRST CAUSE OF 
ACTION WERE APPROPRIATE FOR A DE-
CLARATORY JUDGMENT. 
(a) On June 8, 1964, plaintiffs filed a Motion for im-
mediate trial which was heard by Judge Alden Ander-
son on June 15, 1964 ( Tr. 32 and Tr. 36). Because the 
argument appeared lengthy and because plaintiff did not 
have witness in Court Judge Anderson assigned the mat-
ter to Judge Ellett for hearing and disposition (Tr. 36). 
Without giving defendant's counsel any notice and 
without a hearing plaintiff arranged with Judge Hansen 
to hear the cause of action without having its motion for 
immediate trial heard and without having plaintiffs' ob-
jections timely filed (Tr. 37 and Tr. 40-41). At the 
actual trial defendant advised the Court that plaintiffs' 
motion for an immediate trial and the objections thereto 
had not been heard. The Court then proceeded to try 
the case and indicated that it would take under advise-
ment defendant's objections (L. 4-L. 18-P. 61). However, 
the motion and objections were were never heard and the 
Court in its order (Tr. 43) cursorily stated that the de-
3 
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fenda.nt's objection should be denied. This action was 
patently arbitrary and denied defendant its right to be 
heard. 
(h) There was no necessity that parts of the First 
Cause of Action be heard in advance of the entire case. 
Mr. Sumsion, who was operating under the lease of 
the defendant Thayn, was a progressive contractor who 
was able and did use as much material as did the de-
fendant when he was working alone. (L. 22, Tr. 70, to L. 2 
Tr. 71). The plaintiff had a working agreement with 
Sumsion (L. 21-L. 25, Tr. 84) which is still currently in 
effect which negates the allegation in plaintiffs' affidavit 
that he will be irreparably damaged and that he would be 
deprived of sales opportunities ( Tr. 25 and 26). 
(c) By hearing only part of the First Cause of Ac-
tion, the Court prevented the defendant from presenting 
the plaintiff's breach of the lease and did not terminate 
the uncertainty or controversy. 
Section 78-33-6 Utah Code Annotated, 1953, states: 
''The Court may refuse to render or enter a de-
claratory judgment or decree where such judg-
ment or decree would not terminate the uncer-
tainty or controversy giving rise to the pro-
ceeding.'' 
In the Utah case Gray v. Defa, 103 Ut. 339, the Court 
in commenting on the above statute observed: 
''Borchard in his work on Declaratory Judgments, 
says that the rule announced by this section 
4 
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merely embodies the established Anglo-American 
practice in all urisdictions and indicates both the 
practical and remedial scope and limitations of 
the relief, yet the discretion granted, however, 
wide and unlimited in appearance is a udicial dis-
cretion hardened by experience into rule, and its 
exercise is subject to appellate review. He con-
cludes that when the declaratory judgment will 
not serve a useful p·urpose in clarifying and set-
tling the legal issues, or will not terminate and 
afford relief from the uncertainty, insecurity and 
controversy giving rise to the proceeding the 
Court should decline to render the same.'' 
Granting for the sake of argument that the allega-
tions of plaintiff have some substance, if the Court re-
fuses to hear the defendant's allegations of breach and 
damages (Tr. 21-24) it cannot as a matter of law con-
clude that the controversy is terminated. By granting 
plaintiff udgment there has been little if any of the con-
troversy terminated as it has not touched the main pur-
pose of the contract. 
POINT II. 
THE COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT DE-
FENDANTS' ACTION TERMINATED, CAN-
CELLED AND ANNULLED THE RIGHTS OF 
DEFENDANT TO LEASEHOLD AGREE-
MENT. 
The Court in rendering its finding was rather vague 
in that it did not specify whether all of the activity of 
defendant was objectionable or whether it was just one 
area (Tr. 43). However, plaintiffs' counsel did limit the 
5 
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plaintiff in his presentation to three items of alleged 
breach: 
''The pertinent parts of the leasehold agreement 
are that it carries the definite statement in Para-
graph 8 of non-assignability without a. written 
consent. It also contains certain payments which 
should he made by the Lessor and is an agreement 
to designate the occupied area and fence it. Now 
simply it is upon those items of breach upon which 
we will predicate the problem and which would be 
the subect of the declaratory udgment.'' (L. 24 
Tr. 61 to L. 2 Tr. 62) 
First of all, in considering these items of breach, it 
should be noted that plaintiff's only witness was the de-
fendant even though the plaintiff, J. B. Walker was in 
the courtroom. The defendant's testimony was never 
contradicted and therefore the, plaintiff by failing to take 
the stand and testify contrary to the defendant, admits 
and affirms the latter's testimony. 
In regard to paragraph 8 of non-assignability of the 
original lease ( Tr. 10) it is obvious that this restriction 
was waived by the plaintiff. Defendant testified, while 
sitting in the presence of the plaintiff who did not in any 
way deny or object, that defendant discussed the idea of 
Sumsion operating the plant with plaintiff and that the 
plaintiff assented thereto. (L. 16, Tr. 69, to L. 14, Tr. 71) 
(L. 29, Tr. 78, to L. e, Tr. 79) 
In addition the defendant Thayn, Richard Sumsion 
and an employee of Sumsion all testified that Sumsion 
went immediately into possession of the leased property 
after the agreement "\vas signed November 12, 1963, and 
6 
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that plaintiff made no objection until April 10, 1964 (L. 
7, Tr. 73, to L. 20 Tr. 73), (L. 29, Tr. 73, to L. 26, Tr. 74), 
(L. 1, Tr. 83, to L. 1, Tr. 84) (L. 1, Tr. 87, to L. 19, Tr. 
87). The plaintiff not only did not object to Sumsion 
being on the property and operating under the lease he 
received money from Sumsion prior to his serving no-
tice on the defendant (L. 19-L. 30, Tr. 83). 
The general law relating to waiver of covenants 
restricting assignment is found in American J urispru-
dence as follows : 
''Covenants restricting the assignment of leases 
usually by their terms require the consent of the 
lessor to an assignment, but regardless of the 
wording of the covenena.nt, a breach will not re-
sult from an assignment made with the consent 
of the lessor. Covenants restricting assignments 
are for the benefit of the lessor and may be .waived 
by him, and since he may waive the restriction 
entirely, he may waive compliance with particu-
lar terms and conditions of the restriction. Even 
though the covenant requires the written consent 
of the lessor to an assignment, his oral consent 
may nevertheless be deemed sufficient on the 
ground either of waiver or of estoppel. Parol 
testimony as to the assignor's representations 
that such consent has been obtained is not inad-
missible as varying or contradicting a written 
instrument. So, if, with knowledge of the as-
signment, the lessor accepts from the assignee 
payment of the accruing rents, this is ordinarily, 
if unexplained, deemed conclusive evidence of a 
consent to the assignment, or waiver of the ne-
cessity for a prior consent, since it is a recognition 
of the assignee as a tenant.'' 32 Am. ~J ur. Sec. 341, 
Page 303. 
7 
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With reference to the provision for payments to be 
made, plaintiffs' counsel indicates in the transcript that 
lessor should make certain payment (L. 29, Tr. 61). This 
is apparently a mistake and probably should be inter-
preted to mean lessee should make payments. The only 
payments mentioned by plaintiff during the proceeding 
was an item for taxes in the amount of $1,054.00 (L. 9, 
Tr. 64, to L. 29, Tr. 64), (Exhibit P. 2). 
From the face of the exhibit it is apparent that the 
plaintiff had not required payment of taxes as they ac-
crued as his first and only statement dated January 1, 
1964, covered a period of time of over three years. This 
is and of itself indicates that he was waiting for some 
event prior to submitting a bill. The defendant's unques-
tioned and unrebutted testimony gives the answer. Sim-
ply, that the parties had never agreed upon what part of 
the plaintiffs' property was necessary for the operation 
covered by the lease and that defendant had not been 
in possession of the lease for the period of time covered 
by the statement o ftaxes (L. 22, Tr. 76, to L. 25, Tr. 77). 
How could taxes be apportioned if the parties had not 
reached an agreement as to the amount of property to 
be used~ The pertinent provision of the lease providing 
for payment of taxes specifically provides that lessee 
should only pay "the pro-rata property tax" (Para-
graph 3, Tr. 9). 
The third and concluding item of plaintiffs' allega-
tion of breach centers around the failure to designate, 
survey, and fence area needed for the operation covered 
by the lease. Paragraph 1, Tr. 9, contains the pertinent 
8 
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language covering this problem. '' L.essor here by leases 
-sufficient property located on the east side of W a.satch 
Boulevard - for the purpose set forth hereinabove with 
the further provision that the lessee taking into consid-
eration the requirements necessary, will designate the 
area needed which area will then be surveyed and the 
description of said property will be attached hereto and 
made a part hereof as a supplemental agreement.'' 
While it appears that the Lease requires the lessee to 
designate the area necessary it must be construed to be a 
mutual designation of property. However, this language 
is vague and uncertain as to who has the responsibility of 
surveying and fencing the property even though defend-
ant has indicated he was willing to survey it. The only 
testimony offered regarding the drafting of the original 
leases indicates that plaintiff drafted the documents. 
(L. 1 to L. 10, Tr. 69) 
It is usually the practice of the law to construe any 
ambiguity or uncertainty most strictly against that party 
who drew the agreement. However, wherever the re-
sponsibility lies, common sense and practice indicates 
that in order to use another person's property and fence 
it, there must be an assent and a designation by the owner 
to the property. I~ is uncontested that these paries oper-
ated for approximately three years without the questio11 
of taxes, fences and surveys being raised which certainly 
raises an inference that both parties assented to the sit-
uation until they could mutually designate the area; that 
is until plaintiff ascertained he could sell the lease (L. 
24, Tr. 74). 
9 
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If defendant had the sole responsibility for the per-
formance of the items mentioned above, and the defend-
ant denies that he does, still the plaintiff after three years 
of operation without obection is now estopped from pre-
cipitously terminating the lease. In any event this type 
of alleged breach is not of the nature to warrant or jus-
tify rescission as is set out in American J ;1risprudence 
2nd: 
''On the other hand, it is not every breach of a 
contract or failure exactly to perform-certainly 
not every partial failure to perform - that en-
titles the other party to rescind. Recission is not 
permitted for a slight, casual, trivial, or tec.hnical 
breach. 
''A breach, to warrant rescission, must be mate-
rial; a failure to perform, to warrant rescission, 
must be substantial. In the absence of any spe-
cific provision in the contract to the contrary, a 
beach which goes to only a part of the considera-
tion, which is incidental and subordinate to the 
main purpose of the contract, and which may he 
compensated in damages, does not warrant a re-
cision of the contract; the injured party is still 
bound to perform his part of the agreement, and 
his only remedy for the breach consists of the 
damages he has suffered therefrom. A rescission 
is not warranted by a mere breach of contract not 
so substantial and fundamental as to defeat the 
object of the parties in making the agreement. 
Before partial failure of performance of one party 
"rill give the owner the right of rescission, the act 
failed to be performed must go to the root of the 
contract, or defeat the objects of the contract, or 
the failure to perform a part of the contract must 
be in regard to matters ,, ... hich "\vould render the 
performance of the remainder a thing different in 
10 
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suhstantance from that which was contracted for, 
or it must concern a matter of such importance 
that the contract would not have been made if the 
default in that particular had been contemplated 
or expected. Generally, where a contract is sever-
able or divmisible and the consideration is justly 
apportioned to a part of the contract, a breach of 
that part does not destroy the contract in toto, but 
the other party is nelegated to damages. 17 Am. 
Jur. 2d Par. 504, Page 982-984." 
The defendant has indicated a willingness to pay the 
taxes, survey the property and even fence the property if 
the plaintiff will sit down and discuss the area to he 
used, and apportion the taxes on a fair and equitable 
basis (L. 22, Tr. 75 to L. 25, Tr. 77). 
This area certainly is not the main object of the 
agreement and even if the alleged breaches were unex-
plained still they would not defeat the main purpose of 
the agreement and would not justify rescission or ter-
mination of the contract. The object of the agreement 
between Thayn and plaintiff \Vas the purchase and sale 
of aggregate for roadbase which is not even mentioned 
in the plaintiffs' grounds for Declaratory Judgment. 
POINT III. 
THE COURT ERRED IN NOT FINDING 
THAT THE AGREEMENT BETWEEN TI-IE 
DEFENDANT AND SUMSION WAS A SUB 
LEASE AND NOT VIOLATIVE OF PARA-
GRAPH 8 OF THE LEASE. 
Volume 32, Am. Jur., Section 330, states the appli-
cable law as to the distinction between a sub lease and an 
assignment in reference to a covenant not to assign. 
11 
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''To establish a breach of a covenant in a lease 
not to assign the lessor must show that the trans-
action relied upon constitutes an assignment in 
law as defined above, ... he must show that the 
lessee transferred his entire interest in the de-
mised premises, or a part thereof, for the unex-
pired term of the original lease, parting with all 
reversionary interest in respect of the premises 
affected. An assignment of a lease is distinct 
from a subletting, and it is well settled that a cov-
enant not to assign is not broken by a mere sub-
letting of the premises. Covenants restricting 
the right of the lessee to assign his term are strict-
ly construed, and in order to bring the transac-
tion within the operation of such covenant, it 
must be shown that the thing done falls within its 
letter, as well as within its spirit and purpose.'' 
Section 314 of 32 Am. J ur. Page 290, states the dis-
tinction between subleases and assignments : 
''The distinction between an assignment of a lease 
and the subletting of the premises lies in the quan-
tity of interest that passes by the transfer and 
not upon the extent of the premises involved. Pri-
marily the test is vYhether by the transaction the 
lessee conveys his entire term or retains a rever-
sionary interest however small. If there remains 
a reversionary interest in the estate conveyed it is 
a. sublease.'' 
The fact that the word "assign" is used in the 
agreement between defendant Tha-,Yn (Exhibit P 1), is 
no more determinative of the legal effect than the fact 
that the word ''lea.se'' is used therein. 
Bedgisoff v. Morga.n, 23 Wash. 2d 737, 162 P. 2d 
238, holds that whether a 'vritten instrument is an as-:-
12 
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signment or a lease· must be determined by its legal effect 
not its form. 
In examining paragraphs 1, 2, 3, and 4 of Exhibit 
P. 1, it is obvious that there is a reversionary interest in 
the defendant Thayne and that the agreement thus meets 
the qualification of the legal status of a lease even though 
the language states that Thayn assigns to Sumsion. 
The whole tenor of the agreement is that Exhibit P. 1 
is subject to the leasehold agreement which was made 
part of (Par. 1, Exhibit P. 1) the instrument. That upon 
failure to make payment, the necessity of ceasing opera-
tion by Court order in two years, or the termination of 
the agreement for any cause the lease would revert to 
the defendant Thayn. 
CONCLUSION 
Defendant submits to the Court that the three alle-
gations of breach by the plaintiff have been countered and 
explained by the argument above. That provision 8 of 
the lease regarding assignment without written consent 
was waived. Waived expressly by the plaintiff by orally 
agreeing to the operation by Sumsion. Waived by pass-
age of time with knowledge of Sumsion's presence and 
operation on plaintiffs' property and finally by the ac-
ceptance of money from Sumsion for the use and delivery 
of gravel. 
In addition the legal form of the agreement is a sub-
lease and not prohibited by the restriction against 
assignment. 
13 
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The allegation of failure to pay taxes loses its ef-
fectiveness when it is found that there has been no desig-
nation of what ground is being covered nor pro-rating 
of taxes as required by the lease and especially when the 
first request for payment is made nearly three years 
after the agreement was commeneed. This deficiency, to-
gether with the surveying and fencing problems, are joint 
failures or acquiescence by both parties. This action 
would certainly estop plaintiff from immediately demand-
ing p-erformanee without giving notice and without com-
plying himself. 
Defendant further contends that it has been deprived 
of due process of la"\v in that he not been allowed his day 
in Court on his objections to an immediate trial. That 
because of this omission the Court deprived itself of in-
formation which would have indicated that a declaratory 
judgment was not proper under the circumstances. That 
defendant has been prejudiced in a substantial manner. 
The defendant therefore respectfully requests that 
the decision of the lower court be reversed or that the 
matter be returned to the lower court for a hearing on the 
necessity of a. declaratory judgment and a trial of the 
entire matter at one hearing if necessary. 
Respectfully submitted, 
CLARENCE JACK FROST 
716 Newhouse Building 
Salt Lake City, Utah 
Attorney for Appellant 
14 
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